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Projects Sponsored by The China Law Center
2002

"DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN BEIJING HUTONGS"
Guo Haini and Bradley Klein: Examined dispute resolution mechanisms and informal cooperation regimes among Beijing hutong residents. The aim of the project was to understand the relevance and irrelevance of formal law in governing everyday relations among hutong residents, the extent to which residents are able to cooperate outside the confines of formal law, and the conditions under which cooperation typically breaks down such that recourse to formal legal solutions becomes necessary. The hypothesis of the project is that the lives of hutong residents are structured by an elaborate system of informal social norms that are universally understood but largely unrelated to formal law.

"PENSION REFORM IN CHINA"
Hao Qian: Performed field research for six weeks on the current pension reform in China with a two-pronged approach. One portion of the research investigated policy considerations of the central government, which will shape further reform efforts. Such important issues include choice of reform model, unification vs. provincial diversification and fund management. The other part of the research is on some of the successful local reform measures taken in Shanghai and Shandong. An analysis will be made based on the research to provide comments, evaluation and suggestions on the pension reform to date.

"JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATUTES"
Peng Yanan: Researched the Chinese judicial review of statutes. Without explicit jurisdiction, Chinese courts have developed a ex facto power to set aside certain levels of low-ranked law in specific cases. The institution of Chinese courts plays an interesting role in Chinese legal system. An array of questions were considered for this project. How does it work? To what extent do the courts subject statutes to judicial review? What are the significance and limits of this power? Research of this practice, its weakness, and judges' incentives will enhance our understanding of Chinese judicial and political culture and may contribute to improving Chinese judicial review system.

"SHANGHAI COURT LITIGATION"
Tang Yingmao: Conducted two months of fieldwork in several courts in Shanghai including Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate Court, Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate Court and Shanghai Pu Dong New Area District Court under the auspices of the Coca-Cola World Fund at Yale and The China Law Center at Yale Law School. The focus of the fieldwork is to research the judicial role by examining bank loan litigations, which litigations have accounted for a considerable percentage of court caseloads since late 1980s. The fieldwork research is part of a broader project which attempts to build a theory to value the judicial role in the process of transition from a planned economy to a more market oriented one. The fieldwork was conducted by a combination of interviewing judges from different divisions of courts, researching court opinions, case files and other court documents, and attending a workshop and conference sponsored by courts in Shanghai.

"IMPROVING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF CHINA'S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES"
Xu Kaichen: This project on Corporate Governance was funded by the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization with guidance and consultation from The China Law Center. Improvements in the corporate governance of China's state owned enterprises were examined, as well as the situation that majority shareholders are handicapped by serious agency problems. Unlike an individual, a family, or a holding corporation, the equity interest of the states' shares is not vested in any natural person. The government agents who vote the state's share do not own the equity represented by those shares, nor do they have a significant stake in the outcome of their votes. They cannot be expected to monitor the management's performance in maximizing share value, as a private controlling shareholder would do. As a result of this agency problem, the shareholder voting system fails to exercise optimal control over the management. Although the agency problem is inherent in majority state ownership, the state can exercise meaningful corporate control if corporate governance of the state owned corporations is well-structured. This project surveys the current corporate governance structure of China's state owned corporations, and makes recommendation on possible ways to improve state majority shareholder's monitoring of corporate management. Kaichen also worked on a separate project on The Shanghai People's Congress, for which he received support from a Yale Public Interest Grant at Yale Law School, and was advised by the director's of The China Law Center.